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State Protection for Temporary Agency
Workers: Australian Developments
Elsa Underhill* and Malcolm Rimmer**
1. INTRODUCTION
International debates about the working conditions of temporary agency workers
suggest that these employees, by the very nature of their triangular hiring relation-
ship, require special protective legislation. Agency work involves an agency
employing a worker who is then placed with a host business for a fee. The host
controls the day-to-day work of the agency employee, but does not bear the respon-
sibilities of an employer. This triangular relationship raises several fundamental
questions, including who should assume legal responsibility for employment con-
ditions (the agency or the host), and whether the state must intervene to preserve
employment protection in what is simultaneously a commercial arrangement
(between employer and host) and an employment arrangement (between hiring
agency and employee).1 Too easily, agency workers can fall between the cracks in
protective regulation unless they are given explicit attention.
* Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.
** La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia.
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Although the International Labour Organization (ILO) has passed a conven-
tion and recommendation concerning the regulation of agency workers, national
approaches vary considerably.2 Some European Union (EU) countries have devel-
oped special legislation to restrict the use of, and protect the employment condi-
tions of agency workers by requiring the equal treatment of agency and host
employees and regulating placement durations to prevent displacement of host
employees.3 Raday4 described such interventions as ‘calling the bluff and decon-
structing the triangle’ by attempting to prevent agency employment from under-
mining collectively agreed employment arrangements for direct hire host employees.
Other countries, includingAustralia, have preferred to allow agency arrangements to
operate in a relatively unrestricted way.5 On the one hand, protective employment
legislation in Australia has not been updated to capture agency employment as it
has grown; on the other hand, regulations governing job placement agencies and
independent contractors have been introduced to facilitate and indeed subsidise their
expansion.6
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employment relationships,’ British Journal of Industrial Relations 42, no. 4 (2004): 727-746;
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International Labour Organisation, 2006.
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30, no. 1 (2001): 72-84; J. Burgess, E. Rasmussen & J. Connell, ‘Temporary agency work in
Australia and New Zealand: Out of sight and outside the regulatory net,’ in New Economies:
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This paper is concerned with the impact of this laissez faire approach on
agency workers in Australia, and with the response of Australian trade unions.
Temporary agency jobs grew rapidly in Australia during the late 1990s. By the turn
of the century, they made up around 3% of the workforce, and anecdotal evidence
suggests their share of employment has continued to grow albeit at a slower rate.
Their proportion of the workforce however, belies their wider impact upon labour
market behaviour. When agency work lowers employment standards, a ripple
effect occurs, spreading to threaten the employment conditions of direct hire
employees.
In the context of a weak regulatory environment, trade unions in Australia
responded to temporary agency employment in two ways. First, collective agree-
ments were negotiated directly with agency employers to regulate terms and con-
ditions of agency workers’ employment. Secondly, collective agreements were
negotiated with hosts to limit the use of agency workers and determine their
employment conditions. This second approach offered additional protection to
some temporary agency workers and simultaneously protected direct hire employ-
ees. However, in 2006 the right of unions to continue this approach was curtailed
through the Work Choices amendments to the Workplace Relations Act 1996
(WRA).7 Agency workers could no longer make common cause with host employ-
ees and were left to fend for themselves.
The remainder of this paper falls into five parts. First is an outline of the
limited legislative protection for agency workers in Australia. Second, the paper
explains how trade unions extended their entitlements through collective bar-
gaining with agency and host employers. However, those agreements had weak
substantive content and undercut union job control, favouring the needs of agency
employers and hosts, while low levels of unionization (in general and especially
amongst agency workers) meant any protection through collective bargaining was
limited in coverage. The majority of agency workers continued to experience
poorer terms and conditions of employment than their direct hire equivalents,
and their differential treatment by hosts and often hostile responses from host
employees compounded their sense of vulnerability. These outcomes are summa-
rized in section three, drawing upon empirical data, submissions to government
enquiries, and decisions of arbitral tribunals. The fourth section looks at the legal
constraints on union bargaining over the use of agency employment, introduced in
the Work Choices legislation in 2006. This legislation quickly impacted upon
temporary agency employment. The fifth section then considers briefly the pro-
spects for change under the policy of the current Federal Labour government which
was elected in November 2007 to replace the conservative Howard government.
in Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction, Constitution and
Regulation of Labour Markets, eds C. Arup, P. Gahan, J. Howe, R. Johnstone, R. Mitchell &
A. O’Donnell, (Sydney, Federation Press, 2006).
7. Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Commonwealth).
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2. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION FOR TEMPORARY
AGENCY WORKERS
Historically, minimum employment standards in Australia were determined pri-
marily in ‘awards’ prescribed by industrial tribunals established by the federal and
state governments. Since 1991, enterprise agreements have developed to displace
awards as the main source of employment protection for about 40% of the work-
force. However awards (especially state ‘common rule’ awards) continue to form a
weak safety net supporting just over a quarter of the workforce who are especially
vulnerable and unable to negotiate anything better. In 1993, federal legislative
standards governing aminimum hourly wage and leave provisions were introduced
to supplement award minimum standards. Yet despite these efforts to establish a
comprehensive safety net, gaps persisted. In particular, as Mitlacher and Burgess8
concluded, regulatory arrangements protecting agency workers in Australia were
‘almost non-existent’. Australia has not introduced the protections found in other
countries such as limits on the length of a placement, or synchronization of employ-
ment contracts with host placements. Agency workers instead slipped through the
regulatory net of awards and legal standards designed for traditional employment
relationships.
Most agency workers in Australia are employed on a casual basis,9 and the
regulation of agency work stems from protection designed for employees desig-
nated as casual workers. This has profound implications for their employment
entitlements, and their capacity to collectively bargain to improve pay and condi-
tions. Casual employment is a form of engagement recognized under Australian
legislation but offered little protection by those statutes. It does not have an
equivalent in other developed countries, although on-call employment appears
its closest counterpart.10 Casual employees are paid by the hour, and enter a
new contract of employment each time they commence a new engagement (or
shift). They are not entitled to paid sick and annual leave, although their hourly
wage may include a loading to compensate for the loss of such entitlements.11
The circumstances under which casuals are engaged is left to the discretion of
employers, constrained only by the state of the labour market, by collective agree-
ments, and by awards which (until 1996) often placed a ceiling on the proportion
or number of casual employees.12 Temporary agency employers justify their
8. Mitlacher and Burgess ibid., 425.
9. ABS, Australian Social Trends 2000, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue
4102.0, 2000.
10. I. Campbell & J. Burgess, ‘Casual Employment in Australia and Temporary Employment in Europe:
Developing a Cross-National Comparison,’Work, Employment & Society 15, no. 1 (2001): 171-184.
11. C. Howell, Casual Employees – Recent Legal Developments, Sydney, Paper presented to the
ACIRRT and University of Sydney Law School Conference, University of Sydney, Jun., 2000;
J.C. Tham, Income security of casual employees: A legal perspective, Sydney, Paper presented
to the Australian Labour Law Association Biennial Conference, 2004.
12. Howell, ibid., Campbell & Burgess, ‘Casual Employment in Australia and Temporary Employ-
ment in Europe: Developing a Cross-National Comparison,’ Work, Employment & Society 15,
no. 1 (2001): 171-184.
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extensive use of casual employment on the grounds that the availability of work is
dependent upon demand from hosts and is therefore unpredictable.13 Yet some
agency workers are placed with a single host for lengthy periods notwithstanding
their casual status, especially when the host has outsourced complete functions to
the agency.14
An important source of labour market vulnerability for casual employees is
their exclusion from unfair dismissal protection. Permanent employees are entitled
to procedural and substantive fairness in relation to dismissals, and can be reinstated,
re-employed or receive compensation of up to six months wages when their dis-
missal is deemed harsh, unjust or unreasonable.15 Casual employees are only enti-
tled to this protection when they have been employed on a regular basis for more
than twelvemonths and have an expectation of continuing employment.16 Irregular
casuals, those employed for less than twelve months with the one employer, can be
dismissed without justification, with one hour’s notice.17 This gap in dismissal
protection has diminished since March 2006 following amendments to the WRA
which now exclude all employees employed by small businesses (i.e., 100 or fewer
employees) from unfair dismissal protection,18 and extend allowable grounds for
dismissal to include ‘operational’ reasons, a term interpreted broadly in subsequent
unfair dismissal cases.19 Only on relatively rare occasions have agency employers
failed to persuade tribunals that their employees are irregular casuals. In one case,
an employer was found to have breached dismissal provisions even though the
employees’ contracts specified that they were hired on the basis of engagements
‘from time to time’. The dismissed employee had regularly worked an average
of 23 hours per week for twenty-six months but was dismissed without notice.20
From 2001, casual employees continually engaged for more than six months
could request conversion to permanent employment, subject to that right being
included in an award or agreement.21 This potentially expanded dismissal
13. RCSA, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Work-
place Relations and Workforce Participation Inquiry into Independent Contracting and Labour
Hire Arrangements, (Melbourne: Recruitment & Consulting Services Association, 2005).
14. Evidence presented before the Secure Employment Test Case (NSWIRComm 2006, 38), for
example, included a labour hire casual who could not gain permanency, notwithstanding sixteen
years placement with the same host (para. 269).
15. Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), Part 12, Division 4 (hereafter WRA).
16. WRA 1996 s. 638.
17. C. Howell, Casual Employees – Recent Legal Developments, Sydney, Paper presented to the
ACIRRT and University of Sydney Law School Conference, University of Sydney, Jun., 2000;
Tham, Income security of casual employees: A legal perspective, Sydney, Paper presented to the
Australian Labour Law Association Biennial Conference, 2004.
18. WRA s. 643 (10).
19. WRA s. 643 (8); For example, Village Cinemas v. Carter, AIRCFB 35 (15 Jan. 2007).
20. Isaacs, Jennifer Ethel v. Kelly Services (Australia) Limited, AIRC, PR957545, (22 Apr. 2006).
21. R. Owens, ‘The ‘‘long-term or permanent casual – An oxymoron’’ or ‘‘a well enough under-
stood Australianism’’ in the law,’ Australian Bulletin of Labour 27, no. 2 (2001): 118-136;
I. Campbell, ‘Trade Unions and Temporary Employment: New Initiatives in Regulation and
Representation,’ Brisbane, Paper for the 25th Conference of the International Working Party on
Labour Market Segmentation, 2004.
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protection to agency workers able to convert to permanent employment, however
the entitlement was prohibited from federal awards in amendments to the WRA in
March 2006.22 Unions in the state of New South Wales (NSW) successfully
applied to the NSW tribunal for the inclusion of a similar conversion entitlement
in NSW State common rule awards in 2006.23 The tribunal included casual agency
employees in their decision, but refused the further union claim that agency
employees also have a right to convert to permanent employment with their
host after six months continuous placement.24 The extension of the right to convert
to permanent employment could have had a significant effect across the NSW
agency hire sector, however one month later NSW awards came within the juris-
diction of the federalWRA. This newly won conversion entitlement thus expires in
March 2009 when all state awards become federal awards which are prohibited
from carrying such clauses.25
The majority of temporary agency employees thus remain vulnerable to dis-
missal at will. Even permanent agency employees may not be protected from
employment insecurity by the dismissal provisions of the WRA. In one case, six
permanent agency employees who had been involved in union activities were dis-
missed on one week’s notice due to lack of work, but replaced by newly recruited
employees within a fortnight. The temporary agency companywas found not to have
breached the WRA.26 The tribunal member adjudicating the case commented that
‘[I]t was common and accepted that it was not improper for retrenchments to take
place in such circumstances on as little as 24 hours’ notice’.27 The union’s allegation
that the dismissals arose from the workers’ union activities was not accepted,
notwithstanding that such activities may have been an ‘opportunistic reason for
their non re-engagement’.28 The ease with which employers can dismiss casual
employees, coupled with the acceptability of dismissing permanent agency employ-
ees in the absence of immediate placements has encouraged host employers to utilize
agency employees at the expense of direct hire employees.29 Furthermore, when
22. WRA s. 513.
23. Secure Employment Test Case, para. 38.
24. Secure Employment Test Case, para. 29.
25. WRA Sch. 8. Note however, the status of content excluded from awards in 2006 may change
under the current Labor government (see later).
26. Bruce Neilson, Lawrence Brookes, Andrew Wood, Robert Gore, Paul Bertram and Terry
Clancy v. JSM Trading Pty Limited t/a Workhire Pty. Ltd. AIRC, PR929657 (1 Apr. 2003).
27. SDP Kaufman, in Bruce Neilson et al. v. JSM Trading at 2-3.
28. SDP Kaufman commented that ‘Even if it be the case that the applicants’ so-called union
activities were an opportunistic reason for their non re-engagement this, in my view, was
not a factor in the termination of the employment of any of them’. Bruce Neilson et al. v.
JSM Trading at 13.
29. R. Hall, ‘Outsourcing, contracting-out and labour hire: Implications for human resource devel-
opment in Australian organizations’, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 38, no. 2 (2000):
23-41; ACTU, ACTU submission to House of Representatives Standing Committee Inquiry into
independent contractors and labour hire arrangements, (Melbourne: Australian Council of
Trade Unions, 2005). See also S. N. Houseman, ‘Why employers use flexible staffing arrange-
ments: evidence from an establishment survey’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55, no. 1
(2001): 149-170.
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temporary agency employees have applied for redress for an alleged unfair dismissal,
their cases have often been complicated (and therefore rendered more costly) by
contests over whether they were employed by the agency or the host.30 As will be
shown below, the absence of unambiguous protection against unfair dismissal has
reduced the bargaining power of temporary agency workers.
Low minimum wages and poor employment conditions for casual agency
employees can be related to weak regulatory protection. Agency workers can be
employed under one of five regulatory instruments. The first are minimum statu-
tory entitlements. These began in the early 1990s with Schedule 1A of the WRA
which set minimum standards for all employees in Victoria, other than those
covered by a federal award or agreement. It provided five entitlements: a minimum
hourly rate of pay for 38 hours per week (set at an industry level); five days paid
sick leave; four weeks paid recreation leave per annum; unpaid maternity and
paternity leave; and minimum notice of termination. Only the first of these, the
hourly rate of pay, applied to casual agency employees. Workers employed by
three types of agencies were likely to have only this minimal level of protection:
those employed by small agencies placing workers with similarly small, non-
unionized hosts (typically too small to be brought into the more regulated sphere
involving unions); larger agencies placing workers with poorly unionized or non-
unionized hosts (where agency employees had little bargaining power of their own,
nor could they call upon the collective power of host employees); and agencies
supplying workers in areas of high demand, such as nurses and information tech-
nology specialists (where market forces resulted in these workers receiving more
than their minimum entitlement). The first of these scenarios is especially common
since fewer than 2% of agency employers have more than 100 employees.31
Schedule 1A of WRA was repealed in 2006 and replaced by five minimum stan-
dards now determined by the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) for all
Australia.32 These largely replicate Schedule 1A, although paid sick leave was
extended to ten days and broadened to personal leave while the minimum termi-
nation period was repealed.33 Hence permanent agency employees formerly cov-
ered by Schedule 1A lost their entitlement to a minimum termination notice, whilst
casual employees’ entitlement to a minimum hourly rate of pay remained
unchanged.
The second regulatory instrument involved individual agreements known as
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWA). These were introduced in 1996 to
allow employers to vary employment conditions away from awards and agree-
ments. A number of studies have found AWAs offered lower levels of wages and
30. S. Selleck, ‘Labour hire – why it is not as simple as you might think,’ in Presentation to the IES
Employment Law Conference, Sydney, Workplace Express, <www.workplaceexpress.
com.au>, Jun., 2003.
31. ABS, Employment Services Australia, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat. 8558.0,
2003.
32. WRA, Part 21, Division 2.
33. WRA, Part 7, Division 1.
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conditions,34 however few agency employers initially employed workers under
AWAs. In Victoria, for example, they could rely upon the low Schedule 1A enti-
tlements instead.35 In 2006, the process for establishing AWAs was simplified and
their minimum employment standards reduced to those of the AFPC which would
then displace any prevailing award and collective agreement entitlements.36 The
use of AWAs by agency employers subsequently increased, encouraged by the
sector’s employer association which offered a template AWA for agency employ-
ers to adapt to their own circumstances.37 Importantly from a cost flexibility
perspective, AWAs could be configured to allow different rates of pay for each
placement.
The third regulatory instrument consisted of federal awards determined by the
Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Until the early 1990s, awards were
the dominant form of employment regulation in Australia, offering comprehensive
protections and entitlements. In 1996, their content was pared back to twenty
matters, and award wage increases limited to ‘safety-net’ increases determined
periodically at a national level and intended primarily to protect the needs of low
paid workers.38 Of those 20 award matters, less than half were relevant to casual
agency workers. These were rates of pay, a minimum engagement period (often set
at four hours), loadings for casual employment, ordinary hours of work and load-
ings for work performed outside of those hours, rest breaks, tool allowances and
(subject to minimum engagement periods) pension entitlements. Permanent agency
employees, on the other hand, were entitled to all award conditions, including annual
leave, sick/carers leave, long service leave, public holidays, overtime, redundancy
pay, notice of termination, stand-down provisions, and access to dispute settlement
processes. Nevertheless, agency employees were disadvantaged relative to employ-
ees under collective agreements when award rates of pay, dependent upon safety
net wage increases, fell behind wages paid in collective agreements.39
34. K. van Barneveld & R. Nassif, ‘Motivations for the introduction of Australian Workplace Agree-
ments,’ Labour and Industry 14, no. 2 (2003): 21-37; R. Mitchell, R. Campbell, A. Barnes,
E. Bicknell, K. Creighton, J. Fetter & S. Korman, ‘What’s going on with the ‘‘No Disadvantage
Test’’? An analysis of outcomes and processes under theWorkplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth.),’
Journal of Industrial Relations 47, no. 4 (2005): 393-423; D. Peetz, ‘Hollow shells: the link
between individual contracting and productivity growth,’ Journal of Australian Political Econ-
omy 56 (Dec. 2005): 32-55.
35. Until Mar. 2006, the procedure for establishing AWAs, including checks of their content by
the Office of the Employment Advocate, was widely regarded by employers as sufficiently
cumbersome and bureaucratic to deter their use (R. Mitchell & J. Fetter, ‘Human resource
management and individualisation in Australian labour law,’ Journal of Industrial Relations
45, no. 3 (2003): 292-325).
36. D. Peetz, ‘Coming soon to a workplace near you – the new industrial relations revolution,’
Australian Bulletin of Labour 31, no. 2 (2005): 90-111.
37. RCSA, An Employment Service Provider’s Guide to the Workplace Relations System,
(Melbourne: Recruitment & Consulting Services Association Limited, 2007).
38. WRA Sections s. 88B(2) and 89A(2), prior to the Work Choices amendments.
39. Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) Safety Net Review Wages, Melbourne,
Dec. 457/98 M Print Q 1998.
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State awards formed the fourth regulatory instrument. Mitlacher and Burgess40
note their importance as a further source of protection for agency employees
(outside Victoria which abolished them in 1991), but state awards also have lim-
itations. First, the propensity of agency employees to be employed as casuals
means their entitlements remain restricted as with federal awards. Second, attempts
by unions to establish common rule awards tailored to the special needs of the
agency industry have failed. For example, in Western Australia, the Australian
Workers’ Union applied for a common rule award for agency workers in 2004 that
included a demand that workers be paid the wage rate applicable to host employees
when that amount was in excess of the proposed award rate of pay. This was akin to
the proposed EUDirective on temporary agency employment, that agency workers
receive equal pay with host employees. The union’s application was dismissed, in
part, because of the onerous burden placed on employers in applying this clause.41
In the view of the tribunal, the administrative burden on the employer outweighed
the need for equitable wage levels between agency and host employees. Weak
though state awards are, they remain scheduled to be dismantled under the Work
Choices amendments to the WRA.
Whilst federal awards appeared to offer substantially more to agency employ-
ees than other regulatory instruments, their coverage was limited. This is because
they are easily evaded. Barriers to entry for agencies are low and smaller ‘fly-by-
night’ firms operate award-free or simply ignore legal obligations towards their
employees.42 Also, employers are only legally bound by a federal award if they are
directly named as an individual respondent, or if they belong to an employer
association registered under the WRA. In Victoria, for example, around 50 agency
employers in the manufacturing and electrical contracting sectors were respon-
dents to federal awards through membership of the employer association, the
Australian Industry Group.43 But the Recruitment and Consulting Services Asso-
ciation (RCSA), the main employer association for agency employers (to which
around half the sector’s employers belong), is not a registered employer associ-
ation and therefore its members are not a party to an award. Many agency employ-
ers, especially smaller ones, were thus unlikely to be bound by a federal award.
Instead they were covered by State common rule awards which left no legal
loophole for any employer to escape. The importance of award coverage, espe-
cially State awards, is borne out by research. A 1998 national survey of 43 agen-
cies operating in unionized industries found 69% were respondents to an award.44
40. L.W. Mitlacher and J. Burgess, ‘Temporary agency work in Germany and Australia: Contrast-
ing regimes and policy challenges’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and
Industrial Relations 23, no. 3 (2007): 401-431.
41. AWU v. Adecco and Others 2004, Op. cit.
42. KPMG, Impact of the Growth of Labour Hire Companies on the Apprenticeship System,
(Brisbane, Australian National Training Authority, 1998).
43. L. Stewart, National Industrial Advocate, Australian Industry Group, Personal Communication,
15 Sep. 2005.
44. KPMG, Impact of the Growth of Labour Hire Companies on the Apprenticeship System,
(Brisbane, Australian National Training Authority, 1998), 29.
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Also, Brennan et al.’s 2003 study45 found only 16% of RCSA members, and 25%
of non-members were covered by neither an award or enterprise agreement.46 The
likelihood is that award coverage arose more from state common rule awards than
federal awards, a supposition supported by the RCSA’s claim in 2004 that 62% of
their members were covered by a state award, whilst only 21% were respondents
to a federal award.47
Since the regulatory entitlements discussed above are generally weak, trade
unions have tried to bargain to improve the employment conditions for agency
workers, and to limit the extent to which agency workers undercut direct hire
employees’ conditions. Such collective agreements provide the fifth form of reg-
ulatory instrument governing agency employment. The form and success of union
bargaining for temporary agency employees is discussed in the next section.
3. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND AGENCY WORKERS
Manufacturing was the first blue-collar industry to encounter the growth of agency
employment during the late 1980s.48 At the time, the industry was heavily
unionized and maintained an active shop steward system. Manufacturing unions
reacted quickly to agency employment and negotiated their first collective agree-
ment with a group of major agency employers in 1993. This first andmost enduring
agreement (most recently renegotiated in 2007) applied to placements within the
Victorian capital city of Melbourne. It provided for rates of pay equivalent to those
paid to host employees, preference to unionmembers (outlawed in 1996), and other
entitlements such as pension contributions and the supply of protective clothing by
the employer.49 It also restricted the duration of placements for casual employees,
although the extent to which this arrangement was enforced is unknown. Agency
employers entered into such agreements because it gave them access to clients
where unions had previously opposed their presence. Subsequent renegotiations of
that agreement have only once involved collective action. That strike lasted seven
weeks. It was dependent upon the support of host employer shop stewards and full-
time organizers from the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union since agency
workers themselves were poorly organized, in part because of their vulnerability to
discrimination and dismissal.50 In the 1990s, when the national industrial system
45. L. Brennan, M. Valos & K. Hindle, On-hired workers in Australia: Motivations and Outcomes,
(Melbourne: School of Applied Communication, RMIT University, Occasional Research
Report, 2003), 62-63.
46. Ibid. Their research did not distinguish between awards and enterprise agreements.
47. AWU v. Adecco and Others 2004 WAIRC 13533.
48. E. Underhill & D. Kelly, ‘Eliminating traditional employment: Troubleshooters available in the
building and meat industries,’ Journal of Industrial Relations 35, no. 3 (1993): 398-423.
49. E. Underhill, ‘The Victorian Labour HireMaintenanceWorkers’ Strike of 1997,’ The Economic
and Labour Relations Review 10, no. 1 (1999): 73-91. Preference to union members was
outlawed in 1996 with the enactment of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
50. Underhill ibid.
182 Elsa Underhill and Malcolm Rimmer
shifted away from industry and occupational based awards to enterprise bargain-
ing, enterprise agreements were negotiated with the larger agency employers. Most
of these replicated the earlier multi-employer agreement.51
Most collective agreements applied to agency employees irrespective of their
placement, although a small number were restricted to placements with individual
hosts. Whilst they offered higher rates of pay than federal awards, they were also
tailored to suit agency hire conditions in ways that restricted access to entitlements.
For example, an Adecco collective agreement covering workers placed with a steel
manufacturing host entitled Adecco to direct employees to take annual leave to suit
the operational requirements of the host.52 In contrast, comparable permanent direct
hire employees covered by the engineering industry award could not be instructed to
take leave unless their employer gave four weeks’ notice.53 By allowing flexibility to
meet the hosts’ operational needs, employee job control overmatters such as the pace
and timing of work could be compromised. In effect agency workers were placed at
the host’s beck and call by being required to work to that employers’ direction. An
example can be found in a collective agreement which formalized irregular working
hours for agency workers in the following terms:
In the course of a three (3) month period, employees could work at up to 20
different workplaces. This requires starting and finishing at different times as
required by the client. Employees are also called upon to work overtime and
shiftwork at short notice, as this is the nature of the industry.54
Traditional forms of shop-floor union organizing pose special difficulties for agency
workers. First, the threat of dismissal, or not being offered further placements,
dissuades most casual agency workers from becoming shop stewards, who are
instead typically drawn from the (very small pool of) permanent agency workers.
Second, the very nature of the industry, supplying temporary workers, means the
stewards’ tasks of locating, recruiting and communicating with fellow members
are problematic.55 Collective agreements with agency employers provided some
remedy for this by allowing shop stewards to spend one day per month visiting
members at hosts’ workplaces.56 However, they have also specified that such visits
only take place on a day nominated by the employer and in the presence of an
employer representative, potentially curtailing the independence of shop stewards.57
51. For example, Skilled Engineering Ltd Certified Agreement, 1997-2000 (AIRC Case No. 33481
of 1998), Adia Industrial Pty Ltd Certified Agreement 1994 (AIRC Case No. 31117 of 1994).
52. Clause 20, Adecco Industrial (Smorgan Steel Maintenance) Agreement 2000-2003, Adecco
Industrial Pty. Ltd. And Australian Workers’ Union C No. 35691 of 2000.
53. Clause 7.1.9, Metal Engineering Award, 1998.
54. Clause 13, Alton Personnel PL Metal & Associated Industries Labour Hire Certified Agree-
ment, 2003-2006. This clause was common to all collective agreements cited.
55. E. Underhill, ‘The Victorian Labour HireMaintenanceWorkers’ Strike of 1997,’ The Economic
and Labour Relations Review 10, no. 1 (1999): 73-91.
56. Ibid.
57. Victorian Labour Hire Agreement (1997-2000). This requirement continued into individual
enterprise agreements, such as clause 34, Adecco Industrial (Smorgan Steel Maintenance)
Agreement 2000-2003, Adecco Industrial Pty. Ltd. And Australian Workers’ Union C
No. 35691 of 2000.
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Furthermore, shop stewards elected to represent agency employees at a specific host
cannot be certain their placement with that host will continue. Thus an Adecco
collective agreement cautioned union representatives that ‘[t]he Company at all
times will endeavour to employ the duly elected shop steward at [the host], however,
it should be pointed out that in this type of industry this is not always possible’.58
A more generous enterprise agreement stated that the ‘shop steward shall be the last
employee of the company to be moved from the job site, provided that the shop
steward has the appropriate skills and qualifications to perform the work’.59 That
agreement also allowed paid time for shop stewards to attend union meetings, a rare
entitlement for agency workers.
Whilst collective agreements gave agency employees better conditions than
awards and statutory minimum standards, they fell short of the conditions of
employment enjoyed by direct hire employees. Irregular hours (with an accompa-
nying irregular total wage); work intensification accepted because of uncertainty
over whether the next shift would be forthcoming; and more dangerous work
practices remained entrenched.60 This appears a common outcome when agency
workers collectively bargain for themselves.61 Their inherently weak bargaining
position undermines attempts to match employment conditions to those of direct
hire employees. Lack of a regular workplace and the tendency to be scattered
among many employers inherently reduces their capacity to organize in unions
and bargain collectively.62 In Australia, their casual employment status com-
pounds these barriers. Those who participate in collective bargaining are easily
dismissed without redress. Whilst employers are prohibited from discriminating
against employees who participate in union activities,63 compliance with the law is
low and prosecutions for breaches uncommon.64
In two rare cases, unions succeeded in prosecuting a host and an agency
employer for discrimination against union activists. In the first case, a meat indus-
try employer retrenched the workforce and then re-opened the site with a shelf
company which in turn used an agency employer to rehire the workforce. The
former direct hire employer thus became the host. The direct hire employer’s
enterprise agreement had included a provision for re-employment based upon
58. Clause 34, Adecco Industrial (Smorgan Steel Maintenance) Agreement 2000-2003.
59. Clause 25, Accurate Factory Maintenance Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 1997-2000, AIRC C.
no. 32355 of 1997.
60. D. Iacuone, ‘Power and labour hire in the Victorian construction industry,’ Journal of Occu-
pational Health and Safety Australia and New Zealand 22, no. 1 (2006): 61-72; E. Underhill,
‘Winners or losers? Work/life Balance and Temporary Agency Workers,’ Labour and Industry
16, no. 2 (2005): 29-59.
61. F. Raday, ‘The insider-outsider politics of labor-only contracting,’ Comparative Labor Law &
Policy Journal 20 (Spring 1999): 424; C. Weinkopf, The role of temporary agency work in the
German employment model, Berlin, Paper presented to the 26th Conference of the International
Working Party on Labour Market Segmentation, Sep. 2005.
62. F. Raday, ‘The insider-outsider politics of labor-only contracting,’ Comparative Labor Law &
Policy Journal 20 (Spring 1999): 424.
63. Part 16, Divisions 1 and 2 WRA. 2006.
64. B. Creighton & A. Stewart, Labour Law, 4th edn (Sydney: Federation Press, 2005).
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seniority. The agency did not employ all of the former direct hire workers
otherwise entitled to re-employment on seniority grounds, excluding some because
they had been union activists. The host was found to have discriminated against
those workers.65 The second case involved the allegedly more common practice of
agencies dismissing workers involved in union activities at the host worksite, at the
host’s request. In this case, the agency employer was found to have breached
freedom of association provisions in the WRA.66 However these cases are excep-
tional and serve mainly to highlight the common practice of hosts using agency
employees to de-unionize.
Under these circumstances, agency employees’ pay and conditions were most
effectively improved, indirectly, through union agreements with hosts which spec-
ified the conditions under which agency workers were allowed to work alongside
host employees. In the 1980s, the main manufacturing union in Victoria placed a
requirement upon hosts that agency workers only be allowed in a workplace when
they received the same award conditions as host employees.67 This mirrored the
multi-employer collective agreement reached with agency employers, and extend-
ed its application to agency workers not covered by the agreement nor otherwise
entitled to award conditions. This practice spread to other unionized industries,
such as construction, and was revised in the 1990s to require agency workers be
covered by a collective agreement or be paid the same rate as host employees’
collective agreement. In one such agreement, agency employees’ rates of pay
increased by 20%-30% after the host and union agreed they be paid the same
rate as host employees performing identical work.68 These agreements typically
placed a ceiling on the proportion of the workforce employed through an agency
(often as high as 20%), and included procedures for transfer of agency workers to
permanent direct hire employment should that proportion be exceeded. Unionized
host employees supported these agreements because they limited the extent to
which agency workers could undercut their own employment conditions, thus
creating a cheap labour alternative.
These collective agreements with hosts, a product of union influence at the
host workplace, were an important mechanism for lifting rates of pay for agency
workers. A 2004 survey of RCSA members found that of those who matched their
employees’ rates of pay to host rates, 46% did so because the host’s enterprise
65. Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v. Belandra Pty Ltd (2003) FCA 910 (29 Aug.
2003).
66. AMEPKI v. CHRGroup Pty. Ltd. (2005) QIRComm 6 (24 Dec. 2004); 178 QGIG 64. The AIRC
decision outlined in n. 26 demonstrated the difficulties unions have encountered in such cases.
67. E. Underhill, ‘The Victorian Labour HireMaintenanceWorkers’ Strike of 1997,’ The Economic
and Labour Relations Review 10, no. 1 (1999).
68. Application for certification of an agreement by Australian Air Express and Another for cer-
tification of the Business Development Agreement (AA/TWU), AIRC AG2004/7846 (7 Dec.
2004), Transcript, 175-176. The original decision to refuse certification was overturned by a
Full Bench of the AIRC in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia, s. 45 Appeal, AIRC, C2005/
1301 (24 Jun. 2005).
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agreement required this rate of pay. Only 28% did so because of an enterprise
agreement with their own employees.69 However, these practices depended upon
host workplaces being unionized – a diminishing proportion of the total since the
early 1980s. Collective agreements were also limited predominantly to fixing wage
rates, most other employment conditions being unregulated.
In March 2006, consistent with the conservative Federal government’s philos-
ophy of ‘decreasing the burdens on business’ through offering less protection to a
highly flexible component of the workforce, these collective arrangements were
prohibited from awards and collective agreements.70 That such a prohibition brea-
ched ILO standards on the freedom to collectively bargain has been observed else-
where71 and will not be discussed further here. In the longer term, the continued
prohibition on such arrangements may enable the ‘carving out’ of a poorly regulated,
potentially non-unionized sector within unionized host workplaces.72
4. SLIPPING THROUGH THE GAPS
Notwithstanding the kind of union collective agreements described in the previous
section, most agency employees find their employment conditions are unregulated
except for a statutory entitlement to an hourly wage. Whilst comprehensive data
has not been collected on this topic, small surveys and focus groups of agency
workers, and submissions to several government enquiries point to the absence of
basic protective standards, irrespective of whether agency workers are placed in
unionized or non-unionized workplaces. Four aspects of employment protection
are examined here: job security, minimum wages, employee voice and health and
safety.
Turning first to job security, the lower level of protection for agency workers
was discussed above in relation to their inability to collectively bargain and main-
tain employee union representation. As noted, around four out five agency workers
are employed as casual employees, hired by the hour without protection from
arbitrary dismissal nor entitlements to paid leave, such as sick leave. All studies
69. AWU v. Adecco and Others, 2004.
70. WRARegulation 8.5; See also S. Fredman, ‘Labour Law in Flux: The Changing Composition of
the Workforce,’ Industrial Law Journal 26, no. 4 (1997): 337-352; G. Davidov, ‘The three axes
of employment relationships: a characterization of workers in need of protection,’University of
Toronto Law Journal 52 (Fall 2002): 357-444; DEWR, Discussion Paper: Proposals for
Legislative Reforms in Independent Contracting and Labour Hire Arrangements, Canberrra,
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations.
71. G. Biffl & J. E. Isaac, ‘Globalisation and core labour standards: compliance problems with ILO
Conventions 87 and 98. Comparing Australia and other English-speaking countries with EU
member states,’ International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 21
no. 3 (2005): 405-444.
72. G. Davidov, ‘Joint employer status in triangular employment relationships’, British Journal of
Industrial Relations 42, no. 4 (2004): 727-746, at 730.
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of agency workers in Australia have affirmed this ratio.73 Louie et al.’s study found
their job insecurity was not limited to their present position, but evident through
longer term itinerancy with only one in four being in the same job for more than
two years (compared to 70% of other workers, such as permanent and direct hire
casual employees).74 This level of insecurity impacts upon every aspect of employ-
ment protection, including their ability to enforce the few statutory employment
rights to which they are entitled.
Second is pay. The range of instruments governing agency workers’ minimum
wage entitlements points to the potential for considerable diversity in wage levels.
However, wage outcomes appear skewed towards the lower end of wage distribu-
tions. First, high dependence upon minimum award wages means many agency
workers are likely to be earning substantially less than those on collective agree-
ments. The current award rate of pay, for example, is approximately A$300 per
week less than the most recent round of collective agreements for agency workers
in Victoria (covering around 30 agency employers). Second, casual employees
would normally be entitled to a loading of 20%-30% to compensate for the
absence of leave entitlements. Yet Watson’s75 analysis of a national survey of
just under 14,000 individuals in 2001 (approximately 250 of whom were agency
workers) estimated the hourly wages of casual agency males (including loadings)
were only 8%more than equivalent permanent male employees’. Either their base
hourly rate of pay was less than permanent employees’ or they were not fully
compensated for the absence of other entitlements. Third, a study76 based on
focus groups of agency workers found call centre agency workers earned only
one-third of the hourly rate paid to equivalent permanent direct hire workers for
weekend work (the latter received additional compensation for weekend work).
The same study found that storepersons received similar wages but were consis-
tently allocated the worst tasks, and experienced higher levels of work intensity
relative to their direct hire counterparts. Fourth, because agency workers are only
paid for the time placed with hosts, their total weekly wage can fluctuate consid-
erably irrespective of their hourly wage.77
Third is workplace voice. Agency workers’ capacity to express grievances is
constrained by their casual status which offers little protection from dismissal for
voicing workplace concerns, or being involved in union activities. One survey of
73. A. M. Louie, A. S. Ostry, M. Quinlan, T. Keegel, J. Shoveller & A. D. LaMontagne, ‘Empirical
study of employment arrangements and precariousness in Australia,’ Relations Industrielles 61,
no. 3 (2006): 465-486; E. Underhill, Double Jeopardy: Occupational injury and rehabilitation
of temporary agency workers, Doctoral Thesis, (Sydney: University of New South Wales,
2008).
74. Louie et al., ibid.
75. I. Watson, Contented Casuals in Inferior Jobs? Reassessing Casual Employment in Australia,
Sydney, ACIRRT, University of Sydney, Working Paper 94, 2004.
76. E. Underhill, Double Jeopardy: Occupational injury and rehabilitation of temporary agency
workers, Doctoral Thesis, (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2008).
77. Ibid.; Louie et al., ‘Empirical study of employment arrangements and precariousness in
Australia,’ Relations Industrielles 61, no. 3 (2006): 465-486.
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agency workers in Victoria found a significant minority (around 25%) were dis-
missed for raising a grievance, and as many again were afraid to raise such issues
for fear of job loss.78 Similar findings were evident in a case study of agency
workers in the Victorian construction industry.79
Fourth is occupational health and safety (OHS). Like agency workers in other
countries, those in Australia also experience poorer OHS outcomes.80 Whilst
health and safety regulation has not been discussed in this article, agency workers’
disadvantaged position in relation to OHS and return to work post-injury is under-
pinned by the employment insecurity and lack of workplace voice discussed above.
They are poorly placed to refuse unsafe jobs, to take time off to recover fromminor
injuries, and to insist that their employer comply with OHS laws requiring training,
safe work practices and consultation on workplace safety.81 Yet this is not inev-
itable. A survey of agency workers in Victoria found those with a capacity to voice
concerns without discrimination also had better access to OHS information, felt
safer at a workplace, and were able to refuse unsafe tasks.82 More often, agency
practices, such as the prioritising of rapid placements over appropriate matching
and training of workers, have buttressed a culture of regulatory non-compliance
with OHS obligations.83
The poor employment conditions considered above have provoked Australian
unions into seeking protection either through state regulation (a universal if inferior
safety net) or through collective bargaining (which is superior but limited in cov-
erage). Both forms of protection were curtailed by the Work Choices legislative
amendments introduced by the Federal government in 2006.
5. REGULATION OF TEMPORARY AGENCY
WORKERS UNDER WORK CHOICES
In March 2006, the Federal government substantially amended the WRA 1996.
The amendments of most relevance to this discussion were those which prohibited
collective agreements and awards from containing clauses which constrained or
78. E. Underhill, ‘Winners or losers? Work/life Balance and Temporary Agency Workers,’ Labour
and Industry 16, no. 2 (2005): 29-59.
79. D. Iacuone, ‘Power and labour hire in the Victorian construction industry,’ Journal of Occu-
pational Health and Safety Australia and New Zealand 22, no. 1 (2006): 61-72.
80. E. Underhill, Extending Knowledge on Occupational Health & Safety and Labour Hire
Employment: A Literature Review and Analysis of Victorian Worker’s Compensation Claims,
(Melbourne: WorkSafe Victoria, 2002).
81. E. Underhill, Double Jeopardy: Occupational injury and rehabilitation of temporary agency
workers, Doctoral Thesis, (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2008).
82. E. Underhill, ‘The importance of having a say: Labour hire employees’ workplace voice,’ in
Reworking Work AIRAANZ 05, eds M. Baird, R. Cooper &M.Westcott, (Sydney: University of
Sydney: Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand, 2005):
527-536.
83. E. Underhill, Double Jeopardy: Occupational injury and rehabilitation of temporary agency
workers, Doctoral Thesis, (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2008).
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regulated temporary agency workers (and other forms of non-standard employ-
ment); removed unfair dismissal protection for workers employed by organizations
with 100 or fewer employees; and restricted the arrangements under which union
officials could enter worksites.84 Awards were amended to remove clauses which
breached the revised WRA, and collective agreements subsequently negotiated
were substantially pared back.
These changes impacted quickly upon agency employment practices. The
collective agreement renegotiated with agency employers in Victorian
manufacturing in 2007 was diluted heavily, with most critical protections removed.
The agreement no longer provides for agency workers to receive the same hourly
rate of pay as host employees; shop steward roles have been replaced by employee
representatives and explicit rights (such as time release of one day per month to
visit hosts) replaced by vague terms such as ‘necessary access’; and limits on the
duration of placements of casual employees, as well as a minimum four hour
engagement, have been removed. Agreements covering agency workers continue
to offer higher wage rates than the award safety net rate, but less than the wages
paid to equivalent host employees.85 Furthermore, unions have encountered diffi-
culty enforcing agreements with agency employers. Shop steward networks amongst
agency and host workers have been weakened by other Work Choices amendments,
including the loss of unfair dismissal protection and reduced access to work sites by
union officials.
Collective agreements with hosts can also no longer ensure agency workers
receive equivalent wages to host employees, nor limit the presence of agency
workers. Whilst some host employers have been willing to continue past practices,
others have not. Collective agreements which required consultation over the use of
agency employment have been diluted to require only advice of such use. Employ-
ers need no longer consult over howmany agency workers are hired, which agency
is used (and therefore whether the agency has a collective agreement), and what
rate agency workers should be paid. This has impacted severely upon the capacity
of unions to control the use of agency workers, and protect direct hire workers from
undercutting.
The stability of larger agency employers has also been threatened by the loss
of a floor on wages and employment conditions. They are increasingly undercut by
smaller agencies employing workers hired as independent contractors with no
statutory minimum entitlements. The capacity of the industry to be destabilized
by small operators has long been recognized by the larger agency employers who
have lobbied governments, unsuccessfully, for more restrictive barriers to entry.86
As the scope has expanded for hosts to engage agency workers free of union
84. WRA Regulation 8.5 in Ch. 2; Part 12, Division 4; and Part 15 respectively.
85. For example, the Collex Toyota On-Site Services Agreement 2006 (AG848775 PR971883) paid
A$126 per week less than that received by direct hire tradespersons from Jul. 2007.
86. Skilled Group, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employ-
ment, Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation Inquiry into Independent Contracting
and Labour Hire Arrangements, (Melbourne, Skilled Engineering, 2005).
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intervention, the willingness of larger agencies to abide by collective agreements
has fallen.
Lastly, the capacity of unions to respond to both agency and host employees’
workplace grievances has been reduced through new restrictions on access to
workplaces. Union officials are now required to have permits (granted to ‘fit
and proper’ persons); provide an employer with details of a suspected breach of
employment entitlements when they visit a workplace; give at least 24 hours’
notice of their visit; and meet with members in a location designated by the
employer.87 Previously, agency workers relied on anonymity to report concerns
to unions (because of fear of dismissal). Since unions are now required to advise
employers in advance of the nature of worker concerns, such anonymity is no
longer possible. A similar concern arises from the right of an employer to specify
where a workplace union meeting can be held. Some employers have directed that
meetings take place in view of the managers’ offices, raising fears about future
discrimination or dismissal of union members. Finally, the requirement for union
officials to give 24 hours’ notice before entering a workplace means that agency
workers undercutting agreement conditions may have completed their work place-
ment before the official can get access to the site.
Over time, the eroded collective agreements available under theWork Choices
legislation will result in the eradication of all legal rights available to host employ-
ees to respond to agency workers’ presence and conditions of employment. The
changes introduced under the Howard government have weakened an already
fragile means of regulating the employment of agency workers. Unions had
been dependent upon bargaining power (and formerly the federal tribunal) to
lift wages for agency workers to a level commensurate with direct hire employees.
This rested heavily upon agreements with hosts, which are no longer allowed; the
bargaining power of agency workers, which has always been weak; and action by
direct hire shop stewards coupled with fast responses from full time officials,
which have now been curtailed. With the Howard government removed from
power in November 2007, what are the prospects for change?
6. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
The election of the Labour Party to federal government in November 2007 offers
only limited prospects for reinstating and expanding protections for agency work-
ers. Temporary agency workers were not mentioned directly in the Labour Party’s
industrial relations policy, although that policy offered indirect aid by supporting
the removal of prohibitions on the content of collective agreements.88 Labour also
proposed legislative support for good faith bargaining practices and affirmed its
support for union representation at the workplace, but did not explain how this
87. WRA Part 15.
88. Australian Labor Party, Forward with Fairness: Labor’s plan for fairer and more productive
Australian workplaces, (Canberra: Australian Labor Party, 2007).
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would be provided for in legislation. Unions would once again be allowed to
regulate the wages of agency workers through negotiations with hosts, and expand
the range of issues negotiated with agency employers, such as equivalence with
host employees’ wages.Whether the nowweakened unionmovement will have the
industrial capacity to achieve these outcomes remains to be seen. They were
achieved in the past through collective bargaining supplemented by compulsory
arbitration, and the latter will not be reintroduced. Agency employer agreements
have mainly been negotiated with groups of employers, but the Labour Party has
stated it will only support industry or multi-employer bargaining for low wage
workers ‘such as employees in the community services sector, cleaning and child
care industries’.89 Whether they would extend this right to agency workers, who
may work in unionized sectors but are inherently vulnerable because of their casual
employment, remains to be determined.
Effective intervention to assist agency workers directly seems unlikely. The
new Labour government, at this stage, appears interested primarily in reinstate-
ment of the weak protections for agency workers that existed prior to the Work
Choices amendments of 2006. To date, the government has not acknowledged the
inadequacies of that regulation to both protect agency workers, and to protect direct
hire workers from the threats of agency employment. However, there are Labour
members of parliament aware of the need to do better. Following a Federal gov-
ernment enquiry into agency employment and independent contractors in 2005,
several Labour parliamentarians (then in opposition) recommended that agency
workers have ‘the right to request permanent employment with the host after
twelve months continuous services with the host’;90 that hosts and agencies jointly
share responsibility for OHS and unfair dismissals; and that agencies be prohibited
‘from undercutting wages and conditions prescribed within the awards or work-
place agreements applying to the host firm’.91 These recommendations show an
understanding of critical issues. But they have not been incorporated in Labour
Party policy, nor legislative plans. Furthermore, the Labour government may be
influenced by the employer association representing agency employers, which has
consistently opposed regulation and encouraged individualization of employment
agreements. This association is represented in the Government’s ‘business
advisory’ group which will advise the government on proposed industrial relations
legislative changes.92 The association is likely to resist regulatory change requiring
the majority of agency employers to change their business model to one less
dependent upon undercutting host wages and conditions.
89. Ibid., 14.
90. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Making it work: Inquiry into independent con-
tracting and labour hire arrangements, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Workforce
Participation, 2005), 168.
91. Ibid., 169.
92. Labor names business IR advisors, Workplace Express, <www.workplaceexpress.com.au>
20/02/2008.
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Notwithstanding the proposed changes noted above, and the reinvigoration of
a Government-Labour Advisory Council to consult with unions on policy,93 the
Federal government is unlikely to lift employment conditions for Australian agen-
cy workers to the standards achieved in some EU countries. More likely is a
scenario in which unions will have to depend upon their own bargaining power
to regulate agency workers’ conditions. It will take substantial lobbying by unions
to persuade the current government that not only have employment practices
changed substantially, but those changes demand a radical departure from reliance
upon collective bargaining to ensure agency workers receive fair treatment, fair
wages and a sense of dignity in the workplace.
93. Unions to help shape policy, The Age Newspaper, Melbourne, 3/03/2008, 1.
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